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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jerome Harris was charged with, tried for, and ultimately convicted of a single
count of attempted first degree arson and a “persistent violator” sentence enhancement.
On appeal, Mr. Harris contends the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s persistent violator finding and, therefore, the enhancement must be vacated.
Specifically, he argues that although the State offered substantial evidence from which
a rational trier of fact could find that Mr. Harris had previously been convicted of one
prior felony and two other offenses, it offered no evidence that either of those other two
offenses were felonies.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously detailed in
Mr. Harris’ Appellant’s Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.

1

ISSUE
Did the State offer sufficient evidence that Mr. Harris was previously convicted of two
felonies, so as to support its finding that he is a “persistent violator of law” within the
meaning of I.C. § 19-2514?
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ARGUMENT
Because The State Failed To Offer Substantial Evidence That Mr. Harris Was
Previously Convicted Of Two Felonies, There Is Insufficient Evidence To Sustain The
Jury’s Finding That Mr. Harris Is A “Persistent Violator Of Law” Under I.C. § 19-2514
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Harris argued that, in order for Idaho’s persistent
violator sentencing enhancement to apply, the State must first prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant has previously been convicted of two or more
felonies. (See App. Br., pp.6-7.) He then conceded that the State offered sufficient
evidence to prove he had been convicted of one felony in Ada County, and two other
offenses in Kootenai County, and he argued that the State failed to offer any evidence
that the Kootenai County offenses were felonies. (See App. Br., pp.7-9.) Accordingly,
he concluded the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict with
regard to the persistent violator enhancement. (See App. Br., p.9.)
In response, the State asks this Court to affirm the verdict with regard to the
persistent violator enhancement. (See Resp. Br., pp.4-13.) It seems to offer three
arguments in support of this request: (1) the State does not have to prove the
defendant’s prior convictions were felonies if they were Idaho convictions, as opposed
to out-of-state convictions (see Resp. Br., pp.6-9); (2) the State does not have to offer
evidence that the defendant’s prior convictions were felonies because this Court can
determine, as a matter of law, that they are (see Resp. Br., pp.6, 11-12); and (3) the
State did, in fact, offer sufficient evidence that Mr. Harris’ prior convictions are felonies
because the jury could have guessed as much based on the nature of the offenses (see
Resp. Br., p.12). These arguments, however, are unconvincing.
The State’s first argument is that the authorities relied upon by Mr. Harris—a line
of cases clearly holding that, for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement, the
3

State has the burden of proving the prior convictions were for felony offenses, and that
the State may satisfy this burden by offering judgments of conviction that say the
convictions were for felony offenses or by presenting to the jury admissible copies of the
statutes indicating the crimes of conviction were felonies—are all distinguishable from
the present case because those cases arose in the context of prior convictions from
other states. (See Resp. Br., pp.6-9 (citing State v. McClain, 154 Idaho 742 (Ct. App.
2012), and State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635 (Ct. App. 1982).) The State’s suggestion is
clear: if the prior conviction arose in another jurisdiction, the State must offer sufficient
evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a felony; however, if
the conviction arose in Idaho, the jury need not find the prior offense was a felony. (See
Resp. Br., pp.6-9.)
The State’s argument is unsupportable under the persistent violator statute and
the cases interpreting that statute. The statute provides, “Any person convicted for the
third time of the commission of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had
within the state of Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a
persistent violator of law . . . .” I.C. § 19-2514. Thus, it treats all prior felony convictions
the same, regardless of the jurisdiction from which they arose.

Because the plain

language of the statute is clear and unambiguous in this regard, this Court may not read
into it disparate standards depending on the jurisdiction in which the prior conviction
arose. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011).
Furthermore, although McClain, Williams, and a third case, State v. Pacheco, 134 Idaho
367 (Ct. App. 2000), all involved prior out-of-state convictions (Oregon, Washington,
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and California convictions, respectively),1 that does not mean a different standard
applies to prior Idaho convictions. In fact, under an analogous statute dealing with
felonies generally, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held the State to its statutory
burden of proving even in-state offenses are felonies. In State v. Yermola, 159 Idaho
785, 367 P.3d 180 (2016), the Supreme Court analyzed Idaho’s willful concealment of
evidence statute, which characterizes the crime of willful concealment as a
misdemeanor if the evidence concealed concerns a civil matter or a misdemeanor
criminal offense, and as a felony, if the evidence concerns “a felony offense.” I.C. § 182603.

The Supreme Court held that in a prosecution for felony concealment of

evidence, the State must prove to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the subject
offense is a felony. Yermola, 367 P.3d at 182-83. It reached this holding despite the
fact that the subject offense in that case was an alleged Idaho offense (grand theft). So
just as the Yermola Court applied the plain language of section 18-2603 to in-state
felonies, so too should this Court apply the plain language of the persistent violator
statute to in-state felonies.
The State’s next argument is that the State does not have to offer evidence that
the defendant’s prior convictions were felonies because this Court can determine, as a
matter of law, that they are. (See Resp. Br., pp.6, 11-12.) However, a virtually identical
argument was rejected in Yermola and, in the process, the Yermola Court, drew a
parallel to the persistent violator context:

See also State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 560 (Ct. app. 1989) (discussing the State’s
obligation to prove the prior convictions were felonies, and holding that the State met
that burden, but not revealing whether the prior felony convictions were from Idaho or a
different jurisdiction).
1
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In the instant case, the State argues that whether the subject
offense is a felony is not an issue for the jury to decide . . . . The State
argues in its brief on appeal that “it is not the province of the jury to
classify a specific offense. . . . It is the Idaho Legislature's role to decide
which criminal offenses are felonies, and which are not.” This argument is
nonsensical. The jury would not be classifying the subject offense. Its
role would simply be to determine whether the evidence had proved that
the legislature classified it as a felony. When a jury decides whether the
elements of a crime or civil cause of action have been proved, it is not
determining what those elements should be. It is only deciding whether
those elements have been proved.
Having the jury determine whether the crime being investigated
was a felony is not conceptually different from the jury deciding whether a
prior criminal offense of a defendant charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm is a felony. It is likewise not conceptually different
from the jury deciding whether a defendant is a persistent violator, which
juries have been required to do in Idaho since at least 1918. . . .
Yermola, 367 P.3d at 182-83. Further, the State’s argument fails to account for cases
such as McClain, Williams, Smith, and Pacheco, where it was squarely held that the
question of whether a prior offense was a felony is a fact that must be found by the jury,
not a question of law to be decided by the court. If the question of whether a prior Idaho
conviction was for a felony can be decided as a matter of law, so too could the
determination of whether a prior out-of-state conviction was a felony be decided as a
matter of law. But the Idaho Court of Appeals has never taken that approach; instead,
the Court of Appeals, like the Supreme Court in Yermola, has consistently held that the
question of whether an offense is a felony is one that is to be decided by the jury.
Finally, the State argues that because the Kootenai County convictions at issue
were for trafficking in methamphetamine and delivery of methamphetamine, and that
they resulted in prison sentences, the jurors should have known that they were felonies.
(See Resp. Br., p.12.)

The State claims that because this would have been a

“reasonable inference,” there was sufficient evidence to support the persistent violator
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enhancement. (Resp. Br., p.12.) However, that would not have been a reasonable
inference; rather, it would have been rank speculation. As the Yermola Court explained,
it is the Legislature’s job to determine which offenses are felonies. Yermola, 159 Idaho
at 183. Although one would hope the Legislature’s determinations in this regard would
be logical, consistent, and intuitive, there is no requirement that they be so. Thus, while
one could speculate that the offenses of delivery of methamphetamine and trafficking in
methamphetamine are felonies, that need not necessarily be the case. So if the jury
based its verdict on the belief that the crimes of delivery and trafficking in
methamphetamine must be felonies, that verdict was based upon nothing more than the
jurors’ guesses, not the evidence in the case.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Harris
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the jury’s special verdict finding him to be a
persistent violator, as well as his sentence, and that it remand his case to the district
court for re-sentencing on the un-enhanced crime of attempted first degree arson.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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